

GREEK TYRANTS AND THE PERSIANS, 546–479 B.C.

INTRODUCTION

The word ‘tyrant’ was not originally Greek, but borrowed from some eastern language, perhaps in western Asia Minor. On the other hand, tyranny as it developed in the Greek cities in the archaic age would seem to have been initially an indigenous growth, independent of any intervention by foreign powers. It then became a constantly recurring phenomenon of Greek political and social life, so long as the Greeks enjoyed an independent history.¹

Yet by the late sixth century, and certainly no later than the outbreak of the so-called ‘Ionian revolt’ in 499 B.C., tyranny, at least in the Aegean Greek world, was becoming increasingly associated in the Greek mind with Persian rule and Persian intervention. The association contributed in no small way to the growing unpopularity of this form of government in this part of the Greek world.

The clearest evidence for this comes in 499 B.C., when the Ionian Greeks revolted from the Persian empire. There can be little doubt that one of the major grievances behind the revolt was a resentment widely felt, at least in Ionia proper and in Lesbos, for which we have specific evidence, against the individual Greeks who ruled as tyrants in many cities there, and whose rule was felt to be dependent on Persian support.² There is much about the revolt that must necessarily remain unclear, because of the nature of Herodotus’ evidence and reporting. But his account seems intelligible only on the assumption that there was widespread hostility to tyranny as such in the areas indicated (though probably more against some individuals than others),³ and

¹ I am very grateful to Drs Amélie Kuhrt and Michael Whitby, and to Professor G. E. Rickman, for their careful scrutiny of an earlier version of this article. Their detailed comments have helped to improve the original substantially, though the responsibility for remaining imperfections is of course entirely my own.

² G. Walser, *Hellas und Iran. Studien zu den griechisch-persischen Beziehungen vor Alexander* (Darmstadt, 1984: *Erträge der Forschung* 209), pp. 27–35, at 29, 34, plays down the implications of Herodotus’ account and virtually ignores tyranny as a factor in the revolt, which is put down to internal political and leadership struggles in the Greek cities. D. F. Graf, ‘Greek tyrants and Achaemenid politics’, in *The Craft of the Ancient Historian. Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr*, ed. J. W. Eadie and J. Ober (1985), pp. 79–123, at 80, 84, 86, goes further in denying that there was resentment against tyranny as such. This does not seem convincing, and his argument that Herodotus’ presentation of the Ionian revolt is anachronistic and coloured by his own experiences at Halicarnassus in the 450s (pp. 97–9) is rather forced. Resentment against tyranny did not have to wait till after the Persian Wars to develop. For a recent view of the causes of the revolt, see O. Murray in *CAH* iv².473–80, though contrast C. Roebuck, *ib.* 452f. on the question of trade.

³ H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* (Munich, 1967), i.104, 118, notes the generally lenient treatment given by the Greeks in revolt to their tyrants; Coes of Mytilene was obviously a special case (Hdt. 5.38; see below). He remarks that individual tyrants may have enjoyed a strong personal following in their cities (this is clear at least in the case of Aristagoras at Miletus, a man of great wealth and local influence, cf. the implications of Hdt. 5.35–8, 99, 124–6). This may have been a further incentive to caution, and later in the revolt encouraged the Persians to believe that the Greeks under pressure might respond to conciliatory overtures from their former tyrants (Hdt. 6.9–10, cf. 13).

that tyranny in the mind of the Greeks who participated in the revolt was reliant on the support of the Persian king.⁴ The action of the Persian Mardonius in (allegedly) installing 'democracies' in Ionia after the end of the revolt, implies that the Persians themselves realized this, whatever precisely was done by Mardonius (see below, final section).

Two related questions therefore arise. (1) How was it that tyrannies did not merely remain numerous, but apparently proliferated in East Greece in the late sixth century, at a time when on the mainland of Greece they were fast disappearing? (2) How did these tyrannies come to be associated in the mind of many Aegean Greeks with Persian rule, and fuel resentment at that rule?

These are well-known questions, and they are probably susceptible of clear answers, despite the incompleteness of the available evidence. Yet writers on the subject have generally shown little curiosity in trying to answer them in any great detail. Unexamined generalizations have proliferated, and assumptions have tended to take the place of evidence. The standard view was for long that it had been 'Persian policy' to impose tyrants on the Greek cities under their rule, whether from the early days of the Persian conquest under Cyrus, or only in the reign of Darius.⁵ But how that was supposed to have happened was not generally investigated in detail.

A recent challenge to this established view has been published by D. F. Graf in an article on 'Greek tyrants and Achaemenid politics' (see n. 2).⁶ Graf's study is valuable in exposing the weaknesses of the traditional view, and thus providing a fresh starting point. His argument, in outline, is that there had been no such Persian policy. Rather, it was the practice of the Persians, from Cyrus the Great onwards, to work with the existing institutions of the peoples and countries that came under their power. There were no major disturbances in the Greek cities of Asia Minor at the time of Darius' accession to prompt and justify large-scale intervention by him in their internal affairs. Hence the tyrannies we find in them in the late sixth century had either been there when the Persians came, or had arisen independently of Persian intervention, apart from a few cases that Graf treats as exceptional. Graf's view has begun to win some acceptance, at least in a qualified form, to judge from the new edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iv (1988).⁷ But while it is undoubtedly right that the normal Persian practice was to accept the political and institutional status quo wherever they extended their power,⁸ Graf's argument does not seem to answer fully the questions raised above. Reading of the new edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iv suggests that some uncertainty still surrounds the question, to judge

⁴ See especially Hdt. 5.36–8, 124–6; 6.9–10, 13, 22, 43; also 4.136–9 (the Greek tyrants at the Danube bridge in c. 514), which looks forward to the revolt, though probably anachronistically for the time. Aristagoras' attack on Naxos before the revolt can be read as implying that he felt his position in Miletus was already under threat, and needed strengthening *vis-à-vis* both Greeks and Persians by some conspicuous success (Hdt. 5.30–4).

⁵ See the writers mentioned by Graf (n. 2 above) p. 100 n. 1; see also A. R. Burn in *Cambridge History of Iran*, ii, ed. I. Gershevitch (1985), pp. 295f.

⁶ This is based on his Michigan Ph.D. dissertation *Medism: Greek Collaboration with Achaemenid Persia* (1979), which I have not seen.

⁷ T. Cuyler Young writes, referring to Graf (p. 68), 'Since the conquest of Ionia under Cyrus it had been royal policy to rule the region through the local tyrants who were in power when the Persians arrived. Cyrus supported these tyrants not because he necessarily approved of tyranny, but because the Persians tried, where possible, to rule through existing forms of government. While in mainland Greece there had been a considerable swing away from such forms of government since Cyrus' time, in Ionia tyrants had continued to be supported in their rule by Persians.'

⁸ See *CAH* iv².42f. on Cyrus.

from statements by several contributors.⁹ It may be possible to take the discussion further by approaching the subject from a modified angle. The essential evidence has been collected in meticulous detail by H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* (n. 3 above; hereafter referred to by author's name only). There are suggestive hints in G. Walser, *Hellas und Iran* (see n. 2), 16–19, though these are not pursued in detail. Useful too is J. Hofstetter's prosopographical collection of material, *Die Griechen in Persien. Prosopographie der Griechen im persischen Reich vor Alexander* (Berlin, 1978).¹⁰

The argument to be developed in this article is, briefly, that the questions have been approached too exclusively from the Persian side. Virtually all writers on the subject have discussed the issue in terms of an abstract and impersonal 'Persian policy', and too little attention has been devoted to the self-interested initiatives by individual upper class Greeks, who approached the Persian king in the justified expectation of gaining power and rewards in return for services rendered to him.¹¹ The relationship of reciprocal exchange of services between the king and his favourites, was part and parcel of the Achaemenid monarchy's social institutions and one of the foundations of its power. Since the evidence on Greco-Persian relations is much fuller for the reign of Darius than for that of his two predecessors, the impression received is that it was only under him that the potential of this type of relationship blossomed, as far as relations between individual Greeks and himself were concerned. But it is not easy to determine whether developments under Darius represented the natural continuation of trends initiated already under Cyrus, or whether Darius was in some ways different from his two predecessors. Under him, the Persian empire became stronger and stabler than before, and a more active presence in the Aegean world. This provided the Greeks with fresh challenges and opportunities. Darius himself seemed to show, almost from the start of his reign, a strong personal interest in individual Greeks who had something of value to offer to him. His reputation, and the new opportunities this offered, became quickly known among the Greeks, and the contagion of example spread rapidly. Hence, no later than the time of the Scythian expedition of c. 514, the patterns had been set, as can be seen from the obvious proliferation of tyrannies at the time in the Asiatic Greek cities. To refer to all this as a 'Persian policy' may not be false, but it obscures the all important element of Greek initiative and the interaction between the interested Greeks and Darius himself.

Special mention should be made at this point of G. Herman's important and wide-ranging study, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (see n. 11; hereafter referred to by the author's name only). Herman's study of the personal bonds that linked upper class Greeks, not only within the Greek world, but outside it as well, provides the obvious social context in which this subject can be examined, and he has many suggestive insights to offer. In brief, individual relationships between members of the élite, with all the reciprocal obligations and benefits they involved, were familiar to the Greeks from Homer onwards. As the Greek world expanded, they gradually became extended well beyond the limits of that world. The relationship between Greek 'tyrants' and the Persian king fits into that framework.

⁹ See T. Cuyler Young, pp. 68f., O. Murray, pp. 476f., 486, M. Ostwald, p. 341 (cited in nn. 7, 24, 57).

¹⁰ Hereafter referred to by the author's name only, and H followed by a number refers to an entry in Hofstetter's prosopographical catalogue.

¹¹ Exceptions are L. Gernet, *Anthropologie de la Grèce Antique* (1968), pp. 182f. and (citing him) P. Briant, *Etat et Pasteurs au Moyen Orient Ancien* (1982), pp. 90f., both discussing the important case of Syloson and Darius (below); G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge, 1987), discussed in the next paragraph.

The ancient evidence is of course chiefly provided by Herodotus. Though detailed, Herodotus' account is not complete, as emerges from a comparison with other available information. It is therefore often necessary to read between the lines in order to bring out the implications of what evidence we do have.

The subject should be examined chronologically, and it is necessary to begin with a glance back to the time before the Persians, in order to put developments in the relations between the Greeks and the first three Persian kings in a wider context.

I. BEFORE THE PERSIANS

Three groups of rulers should be considered as possible precursors to the Persians in their relations with Greek tyrannies: the various 'kings' of the Cypriot cities, the Saite rulers of Egypt down to the time of the Persian conquest, and the Mermnad kings of Lydia.

(a) *Cyprus*

Cyprus has little to contribute to this subject. Individual Greeks did maintain relations with the various 'kings' of the Cypriot cities, as Solon with Philokypros of Soloi (Plutarch, *Solon* 26) and the Battiads of Cyrene with Euelthon of Salamis (Hdt. 4.162). But as far as the Greeks were concerned, the power of the Cypriot rulers was strictly local. They were unable in practice to provide any effective support to individual Greek rulers who had relations with them. For example, when Pheretime of Cyrene sought military help from Euelthon in a civil war in Cyrene, Euelthon refused assistance to her, whereas her son Arcesilas was able to raise an army in Samos (Hdt. 4.162–3).

(b) *Egypt*

The case of Egypt was different. The wealth of the land attracted Greeks from an early date, first as raiders and adventurers, then from the 7th century as mercenaries, traders, and visitors of every description. Under the Saite dynasty from Psammetichus I to Amasis, Egypt became once more a strong country, able to preserve its independence from threatening powers in Asia: first the Assyrians, then the Babylonians, and eventually the Persians until the conquest by Cambyses in 525. This was achieved partly by military activity in the Levant, partly by diplomatic involvement and alliances with outside powers that could be of assistance to the Egyptians. It is well known how the Saite rulers relied to an important extent on the use of outsiders, especially as mercenaries, to preserve their country's independence, even though this led to strains within Egypt itself. They paid particular attention to Greeks, both inside Egypt and in the wider Greek world. Necho II was the first Egyptian ruler to make a dedication in a Greek sanctuary, when he consecrated at the sanctuary of Apollo at Didyma the clothes he wore at the battle of Megiddo in 609 (Hdt. 2.159). It was in the long reign of Amasis (570–526) that relations between Greeks and Egypt became closest and involved direct alliances between the pharaoh and two Greek ruling dynasties, the Battiads of Cyrene, and Polycrates of Samos.

The steady growth in the power and prosperity of Cyrene under the Battiad dynasty since its foundation in c. 630 presented the rulers of Egypt with a potential threat, as events in the reigns of Apries (589–570) and Amasis (570–526) were to show. The Libyan ruler Adikran, fearful of growing encroachment by the Greek settlers in Cyrene, appealed to Apries for help, and Apries responded by sending an

Egyptian army. The defeat of this force by the Cyrenaeans provoked a nationalist uprising against Apries in Egypt, led by the general Amasis, which was clearly fuelled by resentment against the pharaoh's reliance on Greeks. Apries tried to quell the revolt with the help of his Greek and Carian mercenaries, but was defeated and overthrown, and Amasis became pharaoh in his place (Hdt. 2.161–9). We know further from a Babylonian text that Apries then turned for support to Nebukadrezar of Babylon, who invaded Egypt by land and sea in 567, with the aim of reinstating Apries as (in effect) a vassal ruler. In the conflict Amasis and the Egyptians were assisted (very probably) by Cyrene, i.e. the Battiad dynasty there, and were eventually victorious.¹² Amasis, whose original rise to power was as a usurper exploiting a nationalist reaction, had thus been forced by circumstances early in his reign to find new allies. This provides the context for the friendship and alliance that he established with the Cyrenaeans, and for his marriage with Ladike, a well-born Greek lady from Cyrene, perhaps a Battiad, as mentioned by Herodotus (2.181–2). Herodotus gives no indication of date, but this must obviously belong to Amasis' earliest years as ruler. Alliance would neutralize the potential threat to Egypt presented by the rulers of Cyrene, and strengthen Amasis' position in Egypt against Apries and the Babylonians.

The link between Amasis and Polycrates of Samos forms the subject of the well known moralizing tale told by Herodotus (3.39–45, cf. 2.182 and see also below on Polycrates). Without doubt there is more politically to the story than Herodotus realized, and it has been suggested that the great naval power developed by Polycrates was partly created with support from Amasis. This could be seen as part of the policy of Amasis to try to build up Egypt's naval defences and secure allies against the rising threat from Persia. With the fall of the Lydian monarchy in 546 and of the Babylonian in 539, Amasis needed all the friends he could find in the Greek world. Hence his courting of Greek sanctuaries (offerings by him are recorded at Delphi, Lindos, Samos, and Cyrene, Hdt. 2.180, 182) and of the Spartans (Hdt. 3.47). But in the end Greek help failed to materialize as expected, and Polycrates deserted his Egyptian ally at the time of Cambyses' invasion of Egypt in 525.¹³

In other words, in at least two cases, a close link did develop between Amasis of Egypt and a Greek ruling dynasty. These were evidently individual cases, where it was of value to the pharaoh to develop connections with Greek rulers who could be of potential use to him. But Amasis had no occasion otherwise to become more closely involved with the internal politics of the Greek cities. His links with the Battiads and with Polycrates did not of course amount to support for tyranny as such, as was to become the case later with the Persians, at least in the reign of Darius.

(c) *Lydia*

The question whether there was outside support for tyranny as such before the Persians, does, however, arise in the case of the Lydian rulers. Lydia was a special case, through its close proximity to the Greek world, its power and wealth, and through its long and close involvement with the Greeks. This affected the Greeks of Asia Minor in the first instance, but also those of the mainland as well, from the very start of the dynasty of the Mermnads under Gyges. To some extent, this close relationship had been foreshadowed by the Phrygian monarchy. Midas was credited

¹² See E. Edel, 'Amasis und Nebukadrezar II', *Göttinger Miszellen* 29 (1978), 13–20 (I owe this reference to Dr A. Kuhrt).

¹³ See H. T. Wallinga, 'The ancient Persian navy and its predecessors', in *Achaemenid History*, i, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (Leiden, 1987), 947–77, at 59–66 for Amasis and Polycrates.

with having been the first foreign ruler to make a dedication at Delphi (Hdt. 1.14), and there is a tradition that he married the daughter of a 'king' of Cyme (Pollux 9.83; Heracleides Ponticus, *Peri politeion* 11.3 in C. Müller, *FHG* ii.216). The Mermnads of Lydia went much further than this, and their impact on the Greek world was profound and lasting, as may be seen from the early chapters of Herodotus (1.6–22, 25–56, 69–82, 84–94).

It is of course in connection with Gyges of Lydia that there occurs the first known use in Greek literature of the word 'tyranny', in a poem of Archilochus (fr. 19 West). Hence the old question, how much did Greek tyranny owe to the Lydian example? Over 40 years ago, Santo Mazzarino argued, against the then prevailing view, that tyranny was an indigenous Greek development that owed little to the Lydians.¹⁴ Did the Lydians set up or encourage tyrannies in the Greek cities of western Asia Minor? Some believe they did. According to D. L. Page, 'Persia in the time of her power notoriously supported tyrants in the Greek cities, and there is no serious doubt that Lydian policy was the same'.¹⁵ This is based on the specific evidence from Alcaeus of a large subsidy paid by the Lydians to the faction of Alcaeus in their struggle against the tyrant Myrsilus (fr. D 11, quoted and discussed in detail by Page *ad loc.*). This seems a doubtful view, and the evidence of Alcaeus shows Lydian intervention in faction struggles in Mytilene, but not promotion of tyranny there. No doubt there is likely to have been more Lydian intervention of the same kind that has not been recorded in the available evidence. But it would seem that on this point Mazzarino was correct in drawing a contrast between the Lydians and their Persian successors. The Lydians had close and varied relations with the Greek cities in their sphere of power, and intermarried extensively with Greek aristocratic families there. But the encouragement of tyranny as such was not one of their methods of control, and indeed individual Greek tyrants are found just as frequently in opposition to the Lydians as receiving their support.¹⁶ For example, there is mention of a tyrant in the Troas opposed to Croesus (Strabo 13.601). At Ephesus the tyrant Pindaros fought against Croesus, whose eventual settlement with Ephesus included the provision that the tyrant should leave the city, which he did (Aelian, *VH* 3.26, cf. Hdt. 1.26 and Polyaeus 6.50; H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, ii [Munich, 1962], no. 109). At Miletus the tyrant Thrasybulus was in power at the time of the conflict against Alyattes, which was eventually settled by agreement (Hdt. 1.17–22, 20–2 on the part of Thrasybulus; *Staatsverträge*, ii, no. 105). Mazzarino's view seems correct, and has been generally followed by subsequent writers.¹⁷ While the Lydians were remembered as having 'enslaved' the Greeks of Asia Minor, i.e. having brought them under political control, and reducing them to the payment of tribute (Hdt. 1.6, 27), and while they had extensive relations with their Greek subjects, they were not credited with the promotion of tyranny specifically. Whatever the similarities between Lydian and Persian rule from the Greek point of view,¹⁸ here was one of the differences.

In sum, the evidence on Greek relations with the rulers of Egypt and the Lydian kings shows occasional support for, or reliance on, particular Greek tyrants in specific circumstances, but no general support for tyranny as such as a form of government.

¹⁴ S. Mazzarino, *Fra Oriente e Occidente* (Florence, 1947), pp. 191–252.

¹⁵ D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (1955), pp. 226–34, at 231.

¹⁶ Mazzarino (n. 14), esp. pp. 191f. (Lydians and Greek tyranny), 244f. (contrast between Lydians and Persians).

¹⁷ Thus Berve i.89f.; C. Roebuck, *CP* 50 (1955), 38 n. 29, citing Mazzarino; S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (1982), p. 18, citing Roebuck.

¹⁸ See S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (1982), pp. 17f., 142f., 158.

Nor were the Egyptian and Lydian rulers seen by the Greeks as supporters of tyranny. The change took place with the advent of Persian power, though it remains to be determined exactly when and how that change took place.

But before we turn to the rise of Persia, there is something more to be learnt from the story of Greco-Lydian relations. As with the Persians later, the question should be looked at from the Greek as well as from the eastern angle. From the time of Gyges onwards the Mermnads became well known to the entire Aegean world, and Gyges' coup obviously received the backing of the Delphic oracle (Hdt. 1.13-14, cf. 90-1). The wealth and munificence of the Lydian kings quickly became proverbial, and provided obvious opportunities to the ambitious and enterprising. The specific evidence for links by individual Greeks of the mainland with the Lydian kings is limited, but carries important implications. Little can be said about the connections between Periander of Corinth and Alyattes (Hdt. 3.48, cf. 1.20-2),¹⁹ or about those of the Spartans and Croesus before the conclusion of a formal alliance (Hdt. 1.68f., 152f.; *Staatsverträge*, ii, no. 113, doubting its historicity). But in the case of Athens there is some specific and suggestive evidence. There is the colourful story in Herodotus (6.125 with J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* [1971], p. 371) about how Alcmaeon was richly rewarded with presents of gold by 'Croesus' (more probably Alyattes), for having assisted the Lydians in their consultation of the Delphic Oracle. This was (allegedly) the foundation of the family fortune.²⁰ Then there is the story of the capture of the elder Miltiades by the Lampsacenes during his 'tyranny' in the Thracian Chersonese, and his rescue through the intervention of Croesus who was acquainted with him (Hdt. 6.37 with Davies, pp. 299f.). Both items of information are incidental details within Herodotus' broader narrative of Athenian affairs, and the implication must be that there is likely to have been more relationships of this kind between Greek aristocrats and the Lydian kings. Sparta's connections with Croesus probably generated links between individual Spartans and the Lydian king. Of particular interest in the case of Athens is the story of Alcmaeon, as an example of a self-interested initiative by an individual on the Greek side, which bears fruit because the Lydian king could see the usefulness of the Greek to him. This is exactly the type of motivation that will operate later in relations between individual Greeks and Persian kings.²¹

II. THE CONQUEST OF CYRUS

The conquest of Cyrus evidently marked a major turning point in the history of the Greeks of Asia Minor, and it came as a great shock to the Greek world. The wealthy and powerful Lydian monarchy that had been part of the scene for so long, suddenly crumbled under the onslaught of the little known Persian newcomer. The Phocaeans and Teians emigrated overseas rather than stay under the new rulers, and Herodotus mentions the plan advocated by Bias of Priene that the Ionians should migrate west *en masse* (i.164-8, 170). Yet how great was the change from the point of view of the Greeks of Asia Minor? It might seem that all that had happened was a change of masters, the old and familiar being replaced by the new and unfamiliar, and that the ruler's demands remained the same. The Persian conquest meant in the first instance

¹⁹ See J. B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 224-6.

²⁰ cf. Herman, pp. 88f.; a young Athenian noble (possibly an Alcmaeonid) was called after Croesus, cf. L. H. Jeffery, *BSA* 57 (1962), 143f. no. 57, and Davies, *APF*, p. 374.

²¹ Note also the activity of Thales of Miletus as an engineer in the service of Croesus (Hdt. 1.75), reminiscent of Greeks in Persian service later (below).

tribute and the requirement to provide military contingents, but that had already been the case under the Lydians (see n. 18). Did the Persian conquest have any immediate and direct consequences for the internal history of the Greek cities, which went significantly beyond the situation under the Lydians?

The evidence is limited, and Herodotus obviously did not record everything that might have been told.²² He presents the Persian conquest in purely military terms (1.141, 151–70), and does not reveal directly the impact it may have had on the internal affairs of the Greek cities. While the other Greek cities took part in the Lydian revolt and resisted the Persians, Miletus alone prudently welcomed the advances of Cyrus before he invaded Asia Minor (1.141, 169; *Staatsverträge*, ii, no. 115). The Milesians were thus able to continue under Cyrus the special favoured relationship they had achieved with Alyattes and Croesus before (1.22; *Staatsverträge*, ii, no. 105).

Hence modern writers have taken different views of the impact of the Persian conquest. It has been argued, more cautiously by some,²³ more positively by others,²⁴ that the setting up of pro-Persian tyrants began already under Cyrus.²⁵ The evidence for these assumptions is limited and probably inconclusive. The Suda s.v. *Hipponax* mentions two tyrants at Ephesus, Athenagoras and Komas, otherwise unknown though they belong to this period (H nos. 59, 182a), and Berve²⁶ suggested they may have been set up by Cyrus. This suggestion is reproduced by Hofstetter, but there is nothing at all in the bare notice in the Suda to support this. Nor can anything much be done with the brief statement that 'Cyrus, having dissolved the constitution [of Cyme], caused it to be ruled by a monarch' (Heracleides Ponticus, *Peri Politeion* 11.5, in C. Müller, *FHG* ii.217).

More positive, though very tantalising, is the evidence concerning one Pytharchus of Cyzicus, a 'friend' of Cyrus who granted him seven small cities in the Troad (i.e. the enjoyment of revenues from them). Pytharchus went on to collect an army and attempt to set himself up as tyrant of Cyzicus (which was not one of the cities 'given' to him), but failed on the opposition of the Cyzicenes. This story comes from a local historian of the Hellenistic period, Agathocles of Cyzicus, and so has a good chance of being authentic (*FGrHist* 472 F 6; H 282). This is the first known example of a practice widely attested with Persian (and also Macedonian and Hellenistic) kings later, namely gifts of (revenues from) land, villages, or cities, by individual kings to individual favourites, a practice which is not apparently attested in the case of the Lydian kings.²⁷ But it raises more questions than can be answered. It is the only

²² He does not mention (for example at 1.77, 79, 81, 83), the (clearly well known and long-remembered) story of Eurybatus of Ephesus (H 110), who was given money by Croesus to recruit mercenaries, but went over to Cyrus with the money.

²³ Thus Berve i.90, 100.

²⁴ Thus G. L. Huxley, *The Early Ionians* (1966), p. 121: 'Already under Cyrus the Persian policy of supporting tyrants in the subject Greek cities had begun' and he goes on to mention the case of Pytharchus of Cyzicus, discussed below; 144: 'After the conquests of Harpagus the Persians imposed tyrants on the Greek cities of Asia and ruled through them'. Also M. Ostwald, *CAH* iv².341: 'the appointment of Persian henchmen as tyrants, as had happened in Ionia after the Persian conquest of Lydia', and O. Murray, *ib.* p. 486 writes of 'fifty years of Persian-backed tyranny' (*sc.* in Ionia by 499).

²⁵ See also T. Cuyler Young in *CAH* iv².68 (following Graf), who presents Cyrus as supporting already existing tyrants, not imposing them.

²⁶ 1.100 and 2.577.

²⁷ On this institution see for example G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (1972), pp. 37–40; P. Briant, 'Dons de terres et de villes: l'Asie Mineure dans le contexte achéménide', *REA* 87 (1985), 53–72; Herman, pp. 106–15.

attested case under Cyrus, and it is difficult to generalise on the basis of an isolated example. One would like to know whether there were many more donations of this kind made to Greeks by Cyrus, in what circumstances and for what reasons they were made, and how far the case of Pytharchus set an example for other Greeks to follow. Strictly speaking, the benefaction of Cyrus did not amount to the appointment of Pytharchus as 'tyrant' in those cities (even though the cities in his possession might well have regarded him as such). According to the story, Pytharchus' attempt on tyranny at Cyzicus was on his own initiative. Berve, referring to the time of Darius, drew a distinction between (a) existing tyrannies in particular cities which submitted to Persian rule, (b) tyrants set up by the Persians in particular cities, (c) individuals granted 'gifts' of land, villages, or cities by the Persian king, from which they drew revenues.²⁸ In practice a beneficiary in category (c) might also be a tyrant under categories (a) or (b) as was the case under Darius with Histiaeus of Miletus (below). But in any case the peoples under the power of such individuals might not see much distinction between different types of overlords.

The evidence therefore does not seem sufficient to allow a clear judgement on whether Cyrus had any 'policy' of appointing or supporting tyrants in Greek cities in Asia Minor. *Prima facie* the Persian demands from their subjects, in terms of tribute and military contingents, might have favoured the rise of pro-Persian individuals in the Greek cities to meet those demands. But the immediate impact of the Persian conquest on the internal affairs of the Greek cities remains elusive.²⁹ Nor is it clear how far he may have conferred benefactions on individual Greeks like Pytharchus who were in his favour. The circumstances of his invasion of western Asia Minor and of the reduction of the Greek cities to Persian rule, were perhaps not propitious for such developments. Despite Cyrus' posthumous reputation with the Greek world and his later idealization, as illustrated in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, he had probably few opportunities to come into closer contact with individual Greeks. His invasion of western Asia Minor was but a brief episode, and for most of his reign he was campaigning elsewhere in Asia. We do not have in his case the abundant and clear evidence of close personal relations with numerous individual Greeks such as is found under the Lydian monarchy and is only seen again later in the reign of Darius (below).

III. THE REIGN OF CAMBYSES

As with Cyrus, Cambyses' activities did not for the most part bring him into close contact with Greeks. With the exception of his invasion of Egypt in 525, opportunities for personal relationships with individual Greeks to develop were few. Nevertheless, some important steps took place in his reign, and they helped to make possible the rapid development of such relationships under Darius.

The conquest of Egypt was quickly followed by the submissions of Cyrene and Barka to Cambyses, though the character of that submission is reported in different

²⁸ 1.85f.; Herman, p. 111, seems to conflate the different cases, but see Briant's discussion (previous note).

²⁹ Hegesistratus, a son of Peisistratus, was set up by him at an unknown date as tyrant in Sigeum after its capture from Mytilene (Hdt. 5.94; H 133). Berve i.88 conjectured that he must have submitted to the Persian king soon after the fall of the Lydian monarchy and have become a vassal of the Persians, but there is no specific evidence for this, though Hofstetter repeats the suggestion. Hdt. 1.169 mentions that the Ionians in the islands submitted to Cyrus out of fear after Harpagus had reduced the mainlanders, but no further details are known, and in practice this was probably no more than a token surrender without effects on the internal affairs of the Greek cities.

ways by Herodotus in two different contexts, perhaps derived from diverse informants. At 3.13 the submission is described as being that of the Cyrenaeans, who allegedly sent trivial presents that earned the scorn of Cambyses. At 4.165 the Battiad Phere-time (H 253) is made to claim assistance from the Persian governor of Egypt (under Darius; see below) on the strength of benefactions to Cambyses by Arcesilas (3; H 50) who was responsible for surrendering Cyrene to the Persian king and volunteering the payment of tribute.³⁰ Whatever the truth, the submission of Cyrene must have been made by the Battiads, then in power, and this is the first definite instance of the submission of an existing ruling dynasty in a Greek city to the Persian conqueror.³¹ It did not automatically identify that dynasty and its survival with the Persian rulers, but it had a potential to do so, as was to be shown some years later.

Also of importance for the future were developments at this time in Samos and in western Asia Minor. The rise of the powerful, aggressive, and internally turbulent tyranny of Polycrates in Samos (H 270) could not but attract the attention of the Persians, whatever the truth about the submission of the islanders at the time of Cyrus' conquest (see above, n. 29). This is particularly the case if, as mentioned earlier, the development of Polycrates' naval power had been actively supported by Amasis of Egypt in an attempt to obviate the rising threat of Persia. In the event, the alliance between Amasis and Polycrates was renounced, probably by Polycrates himself and not Amasis, at the time of the Persian invasion of Egypt, when Polycrates in effect complied with Cambyses' injunction to provide a fleet for the expedition (Hdt. 3.39–45, cf. 2.182; *Staatsverträge*, ii, nos. 117, 118).³² In practice this was to mark the beginning of the link between the ruling Samian dynasty and the Persian king, the consequences of which become apparent within a few years and early in the reign of Darius. Polycrates' activities also attracted the attention of the then governor at Sardis, Oroetes, who appears to have been on his side no less unpredictable and independent than Polycrates. The exact truth of the relations between the two men is probably irrecoverable, but eventually Oroetes lured Polycrates to Magnesia where he met his death (Hdt. 3.120–5). The circumstances of this, and the subsequent behaviour of Oroetes himself, were to have important consequences early in the reign of Darius.

IV. THE REIGN OF DARIUS

The reign of Darius clearly marks the decisive change in relationships not just between Darius and the Greeks generally, but also between Darius and individual Greeks. Almost from the beginning of his reign, there is far more evidence of Darius' personal involvement with particular Greeks than for any of his predecessors. Darius in his reign showed a characteristic reliance on individuals,³³ starting with his own kinsmen, but extending also to numerous Greeks, for whom he would appear to have had a strong personal interest. This seems a novel development compared with his two predecessors, and set a pattern which was inherited by his son Xerxes and became common thereafter in relations between the Greek world and the Persian empire.

³⁰ Cambyses had sent back unharmed to Cyrene Ladike (H 188), the Cyrenaeen wife of Amasis (Hdt. 2.181; see above), and this may have influenced the Cyrenaeen submission.

³¹ The Cypriots submitted to Cambyses before his expedition to Egypt and participated in it (Hdt. 3.19), but no further information is available about the role of the individual rulers in the various cities.

³² See G. Shipley, *A History of Samos, 800–188 B.C.* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 80, 96f.

³³ J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (1982), p. 71 notes Darius' inclination 'to work through responsible individuals or bodies' and also notes (p. 75) Darius' clemency towards such individuals.

The reasons for this change may be sought partly in the circumstances of Darius' reign, and perhaps partly also in his own personality. One consequence of the events of Cambyses' reign was to draw the attention of Darius to western Asia Minor from the start of his reign. The relations of Oroetes and of the tyranny at Samos, and Oroetes' subsequent behaviour during the disturbed interregnum between Cambyses and Darius, prompted intervention by Darius in this part of his empire soon after his accession (below). Then some years later, in c. 514, Darius embarked in person on his Scythian expedition which took him into close contact with the Greek world in Asia Minor and across the straits in Europe (below). Yet the point of interest is that Darius' close relations with individual Greeks had started to develop already before this, early in his reign. The circumstances of the Scythian expedition developed patterns of relationships with the Greeks that had begun to emerge before Darius had even set foot in western Asia Minor.

Darius' interest in particular Greeks who had something of value to offer him personally extended beyond the purely political sphere,³⁴ as several well known cases illustrate. There is the story of the doctor Democedes of Croton (Hdt. 3.129–38; H 79), who was previously working for Polycrates of Samos and was captured by the Persians at the time of the overthrow of Polycrates. Removed to Susa, he became a doctor at the Persian court early in the reign of Darius. By definition this was a position of trust, and Democedes was the first in such a series of Greek doctors in Persian royal service. After making a lot of money, Democedes subsequently returned to his native South Italy, though the exact chronology is unclear. As it stands, the story contains obvious improbabilities of detail,³⁵ but we cannot doubt the essential elements. No doubt the reports of the rich opportunities available to Greeks at the Persian court did not fail to make an impact. Another interesting figure is the hellenized Carian Skylax of Caryanda (H 288), sent by Darius with others in c. 517 to sail down and explore the Indus (Hdt. 4.44). He eventually reached Suez, and wrote an account of his explorations in Greek which was dedicated to Darius personally (*FGrHist* 709 T 4), and was known to Hecataeus and Herodotus.³⁶ He also wrote the first known biography in Greek literature, of one Heracleides of Mylasa who took part in the Ionian revolt.³⁷ It is no surprise to find a Greek engineer, Mandrocles of Samos, being entrusted a few years later by Darius with the construction of a bridge of boats for the Scythian expedition, and being richly rewarded by him (Hdt. 4.87–9; H 207). These are the cases that happen to have been recorded for the early part of Darius' reign. There may well have been others, and Darius' reputation for being generous in rewarding services performed to him will have spread rapidly.

This is of special relevance to the political sphere, and to the development of close contacts between Greek political figures and Darius personally. The locus classicus for this is of course the story in Herodotus of the Greek tyrants at the Danube bridge during the Scythian expedition in c. 514 (4.89, 97f., 128, 133, 136–42, esp. 138 for a list of the tyrants who supported Histiaeus). As it stands, the story has its implausible elements, especially as regards the alleged role of Miltiades, and the presentation may

³⁴ Herman, pp. 28f., 128–30, notes the wide range of services that friends might expect from each other.

³⁵ For a particularly sceptical view, see A. Griffiths, 'Democedes of Croton: a Greek doctor at Darius' court', in *Achaemenid History*, ii: *The Greek Sources*, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A. Kuhrt (Leiden, 1987), pp. 37–51.

³⁶ See *CAH* iv².201–3.

³⁷ See A. Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (1971), pp. 29f., 33. See also on him S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (1982), pp. 20f.

be in part anachronistic and influenced by knowledge of the subsequent Ionian revolt. Yet we cannot doubt that by this time, tyrannies were proliferating in the Greek cities of western Asia Minor and were associated with the support for individual tyrants by Darius personally. Herodotus names no less than twelve such tyrants, though his list is probably incomplete (the emphasis on Hellespontine tyrants reflects evidently the Philaid origin of Herodotus' information). Mentioned by him are Daphnis of Abydos (H 76), Hippocles of Lampsacus (H 157), Herophantus of Parium (H 149), Metrodorus of Proconnesus (H 222), Aristagoras of Cyzicus (H 34), Ariston of Byzantium (H 46), Miltiades the Athenian from the Chersonese (H 224), Strattis of Chios (H 300), Aiaces of Samos (H 7), Laodamas of Phocaea (H 191), the notorious Histiaeus of Miletus (H 161) and Aristagoras of Cyme (H 35). Of these, several are otherwise unknown: Daphnis of Abydos, Herophantus of Parium, Metrodorus of Proconnesus, Aristagoras of Cyzicus, Ariston of Byzantium, and Laodamas of Phocaea. But enough is known or can be inferred about the others to explain how this situation was reached.

On the available evidence events at Samos are likely to have played a decisive role. The brother of Polycrates, Syloson (H 301), had initially shared in the tyranny but had then been exiled by Polycrates (Hdt. 3.39). Whether he went straight to Egypt or not, it was there that he met Darius at the time of Cambyses' conquest of the country. The subsequent story of his reinstatement as tyrant of Samos with the help of Darius cannot of course be taken literally in every detail as told by Herodotus (3.139–49), and scepticism has been expressed.³⁸ But we cannot discount the main elements in the story, namely that Syloson, the member of the ruling family at Samos which already had (admittedly ambiguous) links with Cambyses, met Darius in Egypt and formed a close personal relationship with him. When Darius came to the throne, Syloson took the initiative in approaching him at Susa, presented himself as a benefactor of Darius, and claimed in return reinstatement in Samos as tyrant. Darius readily complied,³⁹ mindful no doubt of earlier events in Samian history under Cambyses, and of the trouble caused at the time of his own accession by the independent-minded Oroetes at Sardis, whom he had to remove by guile (Hdt. 3.126–8). The practical benefits to him of having a loyal follower as ruler in a previously troublesome island were as obvious as the benefits to Syloson personally.⁴⁰ The tyranny's association with Darius continued after the death of Syloson, who was succeeded by his son Aiaces (H 7), in charge at the time of the Scythian expedition, and reinstated by the Persians at Samos at the end of the Ionian revolt as 'a man of great worth who had done much for them' (Hdt. 6.9f., 13f., 22, 25). Thus a tyrant dynasty which had initially come to power independently of the Persians, and perhaps in opposition to them, became associated with Persian power early in the reign of Darius and through the initiative of Syloson.

The Samian example made manifest the reciprocal and individual nature of relationships with the Persian king, if this had not been already clear before. This was

³⁸ The story is dismissed by How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, i (1912), p. 298; Herman, *Friendship*, p. 41 describes it as 'picturesque and apparently fictitious'. See G. Shipley, *A History of Samos, 800–188 B.C.* (1987), pp. 103–7 for a narrative of events.

³⁹ The provision of military support was one of the services expected from a friend (Herman, pp. 97–105).

⁴⁰ On the functions and usefulness from the Persian point of view of the Greek (and other) tyrants they backed, see Berve i.85 with ii.569; Herman, pp. 39f., 74f., 102. To call them 'tyrants' is of course to see them from the perspective of the Greek cities. From Darius' point of view they were dependable friends; indeed, the Persians could be said never to have understood the spirit of the Greek polis (Herman, p. 80).

immediately intelligible to the Greeks from their own social practices, and it probably set an example that had wide consequences. Herodotus tells at length (3.153–60) the story of the devotion of the Persian Zopyros in the capture of Babylon, and of the exceptional rewards he received from Darius in return (3.160). ‘Among the Persians, good deeds are held in the highest honour’ (3.154). Elsewhere (8.85) he comments specifically on the Persian institution of the ‘benefactors’ in connection with two Samian captains in Persian service at the battle of Salamis in 480. One of them, Theomestor (H 308) was rewarded with a tyranny at Samos (Aiaces was probably dead by then), while the other, Phylakos (H 266) was inscribed among the ‘benefactors’ of the king and was given a large estate.⁴¹ The notion of reciprocity in social relations was well known to the Greeks from Homer onwards,⁴² hence Greek and Persian social practices converged usefully here.⁴³ A benefaction to Darius personally would bring its reward in return, and there was therefore every incentive for politically ambitious Greeks to exploit this. Darius himself was anxious to advertise this throughout his empire, as the Behistan inscription shows. ‘Saith Darius the King: Within these countries [*sc.* which were subject to him], the man who was loyal, him I rewarded well; [him] who was evil, him I punished well.’ ‘The man who cooperated with my house, him I rewarded well; whoso did injury, him I punished well.’⁴⁴

The evolution under Darius in the relationship between Greek ruling dynasties and the Persians is also illustrated by the case of the Battiads of Cyrene. Herodotus relates (4.162–4) how the Battiad Arcesilas III (H 50) sought to restore the privileges of the monarchy which had been curtailed by the constitutional settlement of Demonax of Mantinea, but was defeated in a civil war and forced to seek help from outside. While his mother Pheretime (H 253) took refuge with Euelthon of Salamis, from whom she vainly requested help, he went to Samos, where he recruited a large army with which he effected his return to Cyrene. He took violent revenge on his opponents, but was murdered, together with his father-in-law Alazeir, by men from Barka and Cyrenaean exiles. His mother Pheretime then turned for support to Aryandes, the governor of Egypt, who sent an army to reinstate her (Hdt. 4.165–7, 200–5).

Herodotus’ account is unfortunately short of precise chronology, except for the synchronism between the expedition sent by Aryandes and the operations of Megabazus in the Hellespont, which followed the Scythian expedition of Darius of c. 514 (4.145). It has usually been supposed that the flight of Arcesilas to Samos occurred before his submission to Cambyses, at a time when Polycrates was still in power in Samos, though Herodotus does not say this.⁴⁵ Yet a good case has been made for believing that this took place much later, after the Persian conquest of Egypt and early in the reign of Darius.⁴⁶ The point of interest is here that, whereas Arcesilas’

⁴¹ On the function of this institution in the Persian empire see J. Wiesehöfer, ‘Die “Freunde” und “Wohltäter” des Grosskönigs’, *Studia Iranica* 9 (1980), 7–21, esp. 16f.; P. Briant, *Etat et Pasteurs au Moyen Orient Ancien* (1982), pp. 88–94 and in *Achaemenid History*, i, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1987), pp. 23f. and ii, ed. A. Kuhrt and H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, pp. 5f. See also H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, *Historia* 37 (1988), 372–4.

⁴² See for example M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (2nd ed. 1977), pp. 64–6; Herman, index s.v. ‘reciprocity’.

⁴³ Herman repeatedly emphasizes the international character of relationships between members of the élite, pp. 8, 12, 31–4, 44, 72, 74f., 106, 128, 130, 162.

⁴⁴ Darius Behistan i.20–2 and iv.65–7 respectively, cited from R. G. Kent, *Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon* (New Haven, 2nd ed. 1953), pp. 119, 132.

⁴⁵ Thus F. Chamoux, *Cyrene sous la monarchie des Battiades* (1953), pp. 147–51.

⁴⁶ B. M. Mitchell, ‘Cyrene and Persia’, *JHS* 86 (1966), 99–113, at 99–103 with suggested chronological table p. 103, further defended in *JHS* 94 (1974), 174–7.

appeal after his expulsion was not to any Persian but to Samians and Cypriots, Pheretime's appeal was to the Persian governor of Egypt. No doubt her lack of success earlier in obtaining military support from Euelthon of Salamis was a consideration (Hdt. 4.162), but it is tempting to suggest also that she had drawn the lessons from the events at Samos and the reinstatement of Syloson by the Persians. Close links had long existed between Cyrenaeans and Samians (Hdt. 4.152), and Arcesilas had recruited an army there.⁴⁷ It is not known whether Aryandes consulted Darius before launching the expedition, as Artaphernes did later in 499 with Aristagoras' expedition against Naxos (Hdt. 5.31f.). But in effect the continuation of Battiad rule was now openly associated with Persian power, as with Syloson in Samos, and Pheretime had justified her appeal to Aryandes by referring to Arcesilas' previous benefactions to Cambyses.

Another pointer to the rapidly developing personal links between Greek tyrants and Darius at this time comes from the tyranny of Hippoclus at Lampsacus (H 157). He is merely listed without further comment by Herodotus (4.138) as one of the tyrants at the Danube bridge in 514, yet more information is available about him from an Athenian source. Thucydides relates (6.59) how after the murder of Hipparchus in 514, Hippias the tyrant of Athens, anxious for his safety, married his daughter Archedike (H 30) to Aeantides the son of Hippoclus (H 8), because 'he saw that he had great influence with Darius'. Subsequently, the tyrant of Lampsacus provided him with a suitable place of refuge after his exile from Athens and probably facilitated access to Darius himself. This event, which took place in or just after 514,⁴⁸ implies the development of a close personal relationship between Hippoclus and Darius by this time, i.e. before Darius set out on his Scythian expedition. Nothing further is known of the precise circumstances behind this, though we may at least suppose that it took place on the initiative of Hippoclus.

It is unfortunate that nothing is known of the time and circumstances in which Histiaeus (H 161) came to power in Miletus, for Histiaeus is perhaps the most interesting and revealing of the Greek friends of Darius. Already by the time of the Scythian expedition he appears not only as tyrant of Miletus, but as the most determined and convinced supporter of Darius. Histiaeus had fully realized the opportunities presented to the ambitious like himself by Darius' willingness to trust and reward those who did him good services (Hdt. 4.137-9, 141). His subsequent relations with Darius bear this out, and illustrate also Darius' remarkable loyalty to the followers he trusted, even when their conduct and motives might invite suspicion. On returning to Sardis after the Scythian expedition, Darius offered to Histiaeus a reward for his good services, whereupon Histiaeus asked to be given Myrkinos in Thrace to found a settlement there. Histiaeus was evidently not satisfied with a mere tyranny at Miletus, and Darius readily granted his request (Hdt. 5.11). When Megabazus pointed out to Darius the dangers of this, Darius recalled Histiaeus to be his table companion and adviser in Susa (Hdt. 5.23-5). This is the first definite instance (apart from the debatable case of the doctor Democedes) of a Greek holding such a position of trust and influence with the Persian king at his court, for a period of over a decade. It emerges from Herodotus' later narrative (6.29) that Histiaeus, like Themistocles later (Thuc. 1.138), learnt the Persian language. He evidently formed numerous personal connections with individual Persians apart from Darius (Hdt. 6.4),

⁴⁷ It is hard to believe that Arcesilas could have done this without at least the tacit acquiescence of whoever was in control of the island then, but Herodotus (4.163) is silent on who that may have been.

⁴⁸ Davies, *APF*, p. 452.

but was disliked by some Persians who probably resented his excessive influence with the king. These include Megabazus (Hdt. 5.23f.), Harpagus (Hdt. 6.28, 30), and Darius' own half-brother Artaphernes (Hdt. 6.1f., 4, 30). Yet Darius maintained his trust in him, and was prepared to send him from Susa to Ionia after the outbreak of the revolt which he was widely believed, by both Greeks and Persians, to have encouraged, though the truth about his exact responsibility for the revolt is perhaps impossible to unravel (Hdt. 5.35f., 106f., 6.1–5). Eventually Harpagus and Artaphernes procured his assassination, fearing that Darius might pardon him: a well grounded fear, for we are told that Darius regretted his death and honoured him posthumously 'as a benefactor of himself and of the Persians' (Hdt. 6.28–30). Herodotus notes in another context the Persian slowness in punishing errors (1.137), and elsewhere gives an example of Darius reprieving a Persian, Sandoces, a royal judge guilty of accepting bribes, on the grounds that his benefactions to the royal house outweighed his errors (7.194). Royal leniency towards fallen benefactors who might prove useful again, was no doubt a powerful encouragement, as the later examples of the Spartan king Pausanias (H 246) and Themistocles of Athens (H 305) were to show. When making their approaches, to Xerxes and Artaxerxes respectively, they were careful to emphasize previous benefactions to the royal house and promise good services for the future (Thuc. 1.128–30 for Pausanias, 1.137f. for Themistocles).

The case of Miltiades of Athens (H 224), tyrant of the Chersonese at the time of the Scythian expedition, provides an interesting and unusual contrast with Histiaeus.⁴⁹ The Philaid tyranny in the Chersonese originated long before this, while Croesus of Lydia was still alive and ruling (above). It is not known when and in what circumstances the Philaid rulers made their submission to the Persians. At the time of the Scythian expedition, Miltiades was evidently in the same relationship towards Darius as the other tyrants mentioned by Herodotus, despite the transparently fictitious story of his opposition to the Persians and willingness to liberate Ionia (Hdt. 4.137f., 6.41). The story was manifestly put out by the Philaids to excuse themselves retrospectively of the charge of tyranny on which Miltiades was prosecuted when he returned to Athens after the Ionian revolt (6.140). What is unusual in the case of Miltiades is that, while he might conceivably have remained on good terms with Darius and the Persians, he chose instead to return eventually to Athens. When his son Metiochos (H 221) was captured by them during Miltiades' flight from the Chersonese to Athens towards the end of the Ionian revolt, Darius honoured him, gave him a Persian wife, an estate, and his children were brought up as Persians (Hdt. 6.41). During his tyranny in the Chersonese after the Scythian expedition, Miltiades at some time conquered the islands of Lemnos and Imbros (Hdt. 6.140) which he later presented as a 'gift' to the Athenians (Hdt. 6.136). These had previously been taken over by the Persians after the Scythian expedition, where they had set up as governor Lykaretos (H 197; Hdt. 5.26–7). Lykaretos was a brother of Maiandrios of Samos (H 206; Hdt. 3.143), the former secretary of Polycrates, both of them would-be tyrants after the death of Polycrates, though they were displaced by Syloson's appointment (above). Lykaretos died in office, though the exact date is not known,

⁴⁹ The many chronological and political problems associated with the career of Miltiades cannot be discussed here. See most recently B. Shimron, 'Miltiades an der Donaubrücke und in der Chersonesos', *Wiener Studien* 100 (1987), 23–34, though his reconstruction is not followed here. He dates the sending of Miltiades by the Peisistratids to the Chersonese to c. 508, i.e. after the Peisistratids were expelled from Athens and moved to Sigeum (pp. 29–32), and is even inclined to doubt whether Miltiades was tyrant in the Chersonese at the time of the Scythian expedition (pp. 32–4). If this is correct, the distortions in Herodotus' account are so deep as to be beyond viable analysis.

and the islands appear to have been free from direct Persian control when Miltiades took them over. Presumably the Persians still regarded them as being in their sphere of control. Whether this initiative by Miltiades was sufficient to prejudice him with the Persians is not clear, and Histiaeus of Miletus was able to get away with a great deal more, though he did have a very close personal link with Darius such as Miltiades does not appear to have enjoyed. We hear later, in connection with Miltiades' expedition to Paros after the battle of Marathon, that Miltiades had a grudge against a Parian who had defamed him with the Persian Hydarnes (Hdt. 6.133), a tantalizing hint of competition between individual Greeks for favours and influence with the Persians. But the motives for Miltiades' unusual and changing relationships with both the Persians and the Athenians must remain conjectural.

To sum up the results so far. Although in the majority of cases we do not know how the Greek tyrants mentioned by Herodotus at the time of the Scythian expedition had come to power, it may reasonably be suggested that some of them had followed the example of Syloson of Samos and Pheretima at Cyrene in approaching Darius or the local representative of Persian power for direct support. Others, already in power, were not slow to realize the benefits of making more than a token commitment to the new Persian ruler. Hence by this period, the link between Greek tyrants and the Persian king had become much closer and more open than it had been under Cyrus and even under Cambyses.

The Scythian expedition and the years that followed show the continuation of these trends. One of the commanders of the contingents from the Greek cities, Coes of Mytilene (H 182), is seen in action applying the by now familiar device. He reportedly gave advice to Darius during the expedition that pleased the king, who promised him a reward. In return Coes asked to be made tyrant of his native Mytilene, which Darius granted (Hdt. 4.97, 5.11). Herodotus gives no further details about the mode of his installation, unlike his circumstantial account of the return of Syloson to Samos earlier, derived no doubt from his Samian sources. Coes is later found as one of the Greek captains in the abortive expedition of Aristagoras against Naxos in 499, after which he was arrested by Aristagoras at the start of the Ionian revolt and handed over to the Mytilenaeans, who stoned him to death (Hdt. 5.37f.). Evidently Coes had made himself particularly obnoxious to his fellow-citizens. Graf presents the case of Coes as an unusual exception, not part of 'a general administrative policy',⁵⁰ but this seems a one-sided view. Far from being an exception, this could be said to be closer to the (by now) normal pattern. The distinction between preexisting tyrants who consciously linked themselves to Darius, and tyrants deliberately set up by him, was by now becoming rather blurred. The Battiads at Cyrene, and Syloson at Samos, might be said to belong at once to both categories. What mattered was that in both cases the tyrants were seen to be personally linked to the Persian ruler and to be maintaining their power through him. Darius' inclinations provided continuing opportunities for the ambitious to exploit. Herodotus gives another example of this, also in the context of the sequels to the Scythian expedition. He mentions the story of two Paeonians, Pigres and Mantyes, who after Darius' return to Sardis, conceived the desire to become tyrants of the Paeonians. No doubt they were trying to apply the lessons learnt from previous Greek examples. To this end they sought to attract the attention of Darius on his return to Sardis, but Darius ordered Megabazus to deport the Paeonians, and we are not told what happened to Pigres and Mantyes for their efforts (Hdt. 5.12-15).

⁵⁰ Graf, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 84.

Another important sequel to the Scythian expedition was Darius' appointment of his half-brother Artaphernes as governor of Sardis (Hdt. 5.25, cf. 30), where he remained in charge till at least the end of the Ionian revolt. There was now a close kinsman of the Great King near at hand in Asia Minor, at the old and familiar Lydian capital. This provided new possibilities for communication between Greeks and Persians which were quickly realized, as Athenian history after the fall of the tyranny was to show. In c. 507 the Athenians, under threat of Spartan intervention at the time of Cleisthenes' reforms, appealed to Artaphernes for an alliance, though then apparently disowned their envoys for having acceded to Artaphernes' demand for earth and water (Hdt. 5.73). Later the exiled tyrant Hippias is found inciting Artaphernes 'to make Athens subject to himself and to Darius', and an Athenian embassy protesting against this was curtly told by Artaphernes to restore Hippias to Athens (Hdt. 5.96). That at least is how the story was told to Herodotus by his Athenian informants, though the truth may have been rather less clear cut (see n. 52).

Thus by the time of the Scythian expedition, Darius' links both with individual tyrants and tyranny in general were manifest. The Persian court was becoming the natural place of refuge for tyrants who were made redundant by their home cities but were not willing to accept their fate.⁵¹ Hippias of Athens (H 154) had already been building links with Darius as early as c. 514 (above). After his exile from Athens, and his failure to secure reinstatement by the Spartans, he turned to the Persians and was present at the first invasion which led to the battle of Marathon (Hdt. 5.91, 93f., 96, 102f., 107).⁵² Later, the Peisistratids were active in urging Xerxes on to his invasion (Hdt. 7.6). The list of ambitious Greeks who connected themselves closely with Darius continues to grow as time passes. They include, among others,⁵³ the rulers of Macedon, Amyntas and his son Alexander I, who submitted after the Scythian expedition (H 14, 11); Gillos of Tarentum (H 120), an exile who according to Herodotus (3.138) brought back to Darius some Persians captured at the time of the return of Democedes from Persia; Skythes of (probably) Cos, subsequently tyrant of Zancle in Sicily, and his (probable) son Kadmos of Cos who also later became ruler of Zancle (H 290; Hdt. 6.23f. and 7.163f.); Demaratus the deposed Spartan king (H 77) who fled to Darius, received from him territory and cities in the Troad (Hdt. 5.70; Xen. *Hellenica* 3.1.6), and accompanied Xerxes on his expedition; and perhaps Gongylos of Eretria (H 123), who alone of the people of Eretria had medised and been exiled, presumably in connection with the Ionian revolt and its sequels (he is not mentioned anywhere by Herodotus). Like Demaratus he was rewarded by the Persian king (Darius?) with cities in the Troad, where his descendants, like those of Demaratus, were still to be found in the fourth century (Xen. *Hellenica* 3.1.6; *Anabasis* 7.8.8, 17).⁵⁴ After the Persian Wars, he acted as mediator in Pausanias' overtures to Xerxes (Thuc. 1.128).

⁵¹ cf. J. Seibert, *Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte*, 2 vols. (Darmstadt, 1979), i.392-4; Herman, pp. 43f.

⁵² Athenian tradition may have retrospectively magnified the role of Hippias in promoting the first Persian invasion, and obscured the significance of the Athenian disavowal of their envoys' offer of earth and water to Artaphernes in 507. In Persian eyes, the Athenians then compounded their offence by giving support to the Ionians in revolt. See A. Kuhrt, 'Earth and water', in *Achaemenid History*, iii: *Method and Theory*, ed. A. Kuhrt and H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (Leiden, 1988), pp. 87-99, esp. 91-3, 98f. on Athens and the Persians.

⁵³ See Hofstetter, pp. 192-4 for a complete list.

⁵⁴ On both see P. Briant, *REA* 87 (1985), 62-4.

V. CONCLUSION

Thus the main patterns were set by the time of the outbreak of the Ionian revolt. Did the outcome of the revolt bring about any significant change in the Persian practice? Herodotus' emphatic statement (6.43) that in 492 Mardonius put down all the tyrannies in Ionia, and replaced them with 'democracies', might suggest so. But the assertion of Herodotus is notoriously problematical, since tyrants are found soon after in Samos, Chios, Halicarnassus, Lampsacus, perhaps Cos,⁵⁵ and various compromise solutions have been suggested.⁵⁶ Yet some are still prepared to regard the settlement of Mardonius, whatever it involved, as marking a turning point.⁵⁷ Something must presumably lurk behind the statement of Herodotus, such as for example the re-establishment of at least a façade of constitutional government, though exactly what happened we cannot say. In any case the Persian action will only have applied to 'Ionia', in whatever sense of the term. It did not affect Persian support for other dynastic régimes elsewhere (as the rulers of Macedon, the local dynasts in Caria, the various Cypriot 'kings', or the Battiads in Cyrene). If Herodotus had not made this particular point, we would not have assumed that anything had changed at all in the Persian attitude. J. M. Cook suggested⁵⁸ that the move of Mardonius was designed to impress the Greeks, not just those of Asia Minor, before the start of the projected invasion of Greece, but if so the presence of the exiled tyrant Hippias at Marathon in 490 was a bad advertisement. When Xerxes came to power, he simply followed in practice the patterns set by his father Darius. He inherited Darius' Greek friends and connections, notably the Peisistratids, the tyrannies of Samos and Chios, Demaratus and his descendants, perhaps also Gongylos of Eretria and his descendants.⁵⁹ He continued the same system of rewarding benefactors with gifts and positions of power (see above on the Samians Theomestor and Phylakos in 480). He welcomed the approaches of the Aleuads of Thessaly before and during the invasion (H 114, 314, 318), and of Pausanias of Sparta afterwards. The association between tyranny and 'medism' was well established, at least as far as the Greek world was concerned, and would endure beyond the Persian Wars.

University of St Andrews

M. M. AUSTIN

⁵⁵ See already How and Wells, *Commentary on Herodotus* ii.80.

⁵⁶ See for example How and Wells (previous note); Berve i.105f. and ii.581; A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (2nd ed., 1984), p. 222; S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (1982), p. 22 and n. 128.

⁵⁷ Especially T. Cuyler Young, *CAH* iv².68f.: '[after the Ionian revolt] there was a marked change in the imperial attitude towards the tyrants [...] Henceforward we witness the rather ironical fact that the despotic Persians became the staunch supporters of democratic government for the Asia Greeks'. Also O. Murray, *ib.* p. 490, who accepts without comment or qualification Herodotus' account of Mardonius' action; S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (1982), p. 18: 'a partial return to Lydian conditions'.

⁵⁸ J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (1982), p. 96.

⁵⁹ On the hereditary nature of personal friendships, cf. Herman, pp. 16f., 69f., 152.